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Abstract 
 
The GCC countries are characterized by a high incidence of foreigners in both 
the overall population and the labour force as well as by deep inequalities in social 
and economic terms. These features have influenced the labour market and fuelled 
mutual tensions and grievances between nationals and foreigners. Consequently, 
these countries need to reconcile the demands of economic growth with those of 
social stability. The latter requires more stable economic dynamics, which prevent 
the redistributive effects of inflation.  
The experience of the new millennium has shown that the dollar peg, which 
characterizes the exchange rate regime of the GCC countries, has been a major 
vehicle of inflation for the Gulf economies and suggests that it should be amended. 
The alternative proposed in this paper is to anchor the national currencies to a 
basket of strong currencies that mirror the direction and intensity of commercial 
and financial flows on the international market and in which there is also the euro.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In May 1981, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the Union of Arab Emirates, Kuwait, 
Qatar and Oman set up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in order to achieve 
closer co-operation and integration in all sectors. In the economic sector, the 
integration process included the following milestones: setting up of a free exchange 
area in 1983; creation of a customs union in 2003; start of a single market in 
January 2008. The latest is the introduction of a single currency on European 
Monetary Union model. This step was initially scheduled for January 2010 and was 
subsequently postponed due to divergences and conflicts that arose between the 
GCC members.1 
Geographically speaking, the six countries make up an area that is dominated by 
Saudi Arabia - which includes over 68% of its population, estimated at about 40 
million people, and 83.6% of its surface.  
Despite the small size of most GCC countries and the prevalence of unusable 
land in Saudi Arabia - due to the hot climate and the large extension of desert land 
- the Gulf economies have become  major actors in the international global arena 
during this new millennium. This can be explained by two main reasons: 
a. the GCC area includes 40% of world oil reserves as well as 23% of natural 
gas reserves, which makes it one of the leading producers and exporters of 
hydrocarbons; 
b. thanks to foreign exchange reserves piled up over the new millennium,  
following the growth in the world's oil demand and the standing increase in oil 
prices from 2001 to the first half of 2008, the GCC countries can impact 
considerably on international financial markets.  At the end of 2008, they ranked 
second after China as net capital exporters.  Indeed, 13.6% of the world's net 
capital exports could be traced back to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates - 
compared to 23.4% of China and 12.9% of Germany (IMF, 2009a). Additionally, 
three of the leading sovereign wealth funds currently operating on international 
markets belong to this area - namely, the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), the 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), and the Kuwait Investment Authority 
(KIA).2 
                                                 
1
 In December 2006, Oman declared its inability to join the Union by 2010 as it considered 
the tax constraints envisaged by the latter to be excessively stringent; in May 2007, Kuwait 
relinquished the dollar peg and anchored its currency to a currency basket; in May 2009, 
the Arab Emirates withdrew from the agreement after the Council’s decision to locate the 
headquarters of the Gulf’s Central Bank in Riyadh rather than in their territories.  
2
 As estimated by the Institute of International Finance, they managed about 630 billion of 
US dollars in 2008 – which amount rises to about 1.1 trillion if one includes the reserves 
managed by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) (IIF, 2009).  
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The above considerations help explain why the GCC area continued growing at 
a mean yearly rate of 6.4% even in 2008, while null or negative rates featured in 
the rest of the world following the explosion of the international economic and 
financial crisis (IMF, 2010a). 
In fact, the Gulf countries would appear to have been affected only indirectly 
and any case to a limited extent by the financial crisis that started spreading 
worldwide from the second half of 2007. Conversely, they were markedly affected 
by the global economic imbalance that kept worsening throughout the new 
millennium and was ultimately the cause of the financial crisis. 
The importance attained by these countries as leading actors in the world 
economic arena, along with the possible impact that their domestic developments 
may produce on the international milieu, point to the appropriateness of re-
considering the effects of the said imbalance in the light of some characteristics 
that feature in the GCC members - so as to outline some possible guidance for the 
future, especially with a view to the monetary union they have planned. 
 
 
2. The Global Economic Imbalance in the Dollar Area 
 
The global economic imbalance was the subject of a lively debate in economic 
literature, including contributions from, amongst others, Mc Kinnon (2005, 2006, 
2007), Bernanke (2005), Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003, 2004), Bhide, 
Phelps (2005), and Cooper (2005). Although there is no consensus on its causes, it 
is generally agreed that it impacts on the structure of the balance of payments of 
the main world economic actors - with particular regard to those of the dollar area. 
Over the last decade, the growing deficit of the US current account balance has 
been accompanied by the growing surplus of various emerging economies. 
Since 1983, the US balance of payments has been characterized by the dual 
presence of a current account deficit and a systematic and growing surplus in the 
financial account. However, the opposite imbalances of the two sections of the 
external accounts have expanded  further during the new millennium and found 
their counterpart  in the rising current account surpluses of the GCC countries, 
China and developing Asian countries (Fig.1). 
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Figura 1- Balance of Payments (billions of U.S. dollars) 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; IMF, World 
Economic Outlook, April 2010; IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and 
Central Asia, Oct. 2009.  
 
On different grounds, these countries have shown major surpluses in the 
balance on goods and services. While the successful export-led policies, as fostered 
by the major inflow of direct foreign investments, may account for the growing 
surplus of developing Asian economies, the increase in oil prices and exports 
underlies the surpluses shown by oil producers as well as by GCC countries. 
In both cases the surplus has facilitated the creation of official reserves, most of 
which have been used to acquire foreign financial assets - in particular, US assets. 
Accordingly, these economies have become major holders of US financial 
securities (Fig.2). 
More specifically, China overtook Japan in 2009 as the leading holder of US 
assets, while GCC countries quadrupled their assets in the 2002-2009 period and 
now rank seventh on the list of foreign holdings of US assets - after China, Japan, 
the United Kingdom, Cayman Islands, Luxembourg, and Belgium (US Treasury 
Department, 2010).3 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 In fact, these data underestimate the actual financial holdings of GCC countries. While in 
the 1970’s petrodollars were deposited with the international banking system and invested 
directly by the latter, most proceeds from oil surpluses are currently re-cycled via other 
financial markets, which hide the ultimate identity of the individual investors and also 
makes it more difficult to monitor and quantify the actual capital flows targeted abroad. 
This is why the assessment of the foreign assets actually held by these countries requires 
taking also account of the securities to be referred to the UK, Luxembourg, Switzerland, 
and the Cayman Islands.  
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Figura 2 - Official Reserves and Foreign Holding of U.S. Securities of Some 
                 Emerging and Developing Economies (billions of U.S. dollars) 
 
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2010; IMF, Regional  Economic Outlook, 
May 2010; U.S. Department of the Treasury,  Foreign Portfolio Holdings of US Securities 
Historical Data.  
* Excludes Hong Kong , Macau, and Taiwan. ** Includes GCC Countries, Iran and Iraq.  
 
These processes have contributed to reinforcing the US status as the world's 
leading debtor, with net capital imports amounting to 43.4% of the world's imports 
in 2008 (IMF, 2009a); while China and the GCC countries have become the main 
creditors. 
This is an abnormal development, pointing to deep-ranging imbalances in the 
international economic system. Indeed, the efficiency logic predicates that capitals 
should flow from richer countries - where they are more plentiful and their yield is 
lower - to poorer countries - where they are scarce and more profitable. 
Conversely, the current  situation would appear to show that the strongest economy 
in the world is subtracting savings from countries that have yet to complete their 
growth process,  fast-paced as the latter may be, in order to finance its own high 
consumption standards. 
As regards the Gulf countries, the opposite imbalances in their balances of 
payments and the US, have produced considerable effects due to their interaction 
with three major features of their economies, namely: 
1. population dynamics; 
2. labour market structure; 
3. exchange rate regimes. 
 
3. Population Dynamics and Migration Flows 
 
As shown in Figure 3, from 1950 to the end of the first decade in the new 
century the population of the GCC countries rose from 4 million to about 40 
million people - with a growth rate that was among the highest in the world and 
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was favored not only by the natural population growth rate, but also by significant 
net migration flows. 
 
Figura 3 - Population Growth and  Net Migration Flows (values in thousands) 
              
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: the 
2008 Revision Population Database. 
* Estimates 
 
The high dependence of the Gulf area on hydrocarbons production and exports 
played a key role in its population dynamics as well as in the labour market 
structure. Indeed, the small population of the GCC countries, the lack of 
specialised labour, the high inactivity rate and widespread illiteracy resulted in the 
imbalance between the offer of domestic labour and the increasing demand related 
to the development of oil sector. This gap has been bridged by importing foreign 
workers since the 1930's, when major oil fields were discovered and the first 
extractions began. 
Although the flows changed in connection with the events occurring in the 
hydrocarbons market as well as following the conflicts that have ever been a 
feature of the Middle East area, migration inflows have become a particular feature 
of the GCC region so much so that it has become one of the leading destination 
regions for migration flows. In the 1950 - 2010 period, net migration flows of 
foreign workers in the individual five-year spans were always positive, the sole 
exception being the 1990-1995 period when the Gulf War took place.  
The migration flows that have featured in the Gulf area since the first half of the 
past century can be broken down into three sub-periods as a function of the foreign 
workers' countries of origin as well as of their sector-related utilization. 
- One first sub-period covers the years from the oil discovery in the 1930's up to 
the first half of the 1970's. This period featured the inflow of foreign workers 
mainly from the Arab region. The conflicts and tensions that were rife in those 
years, including the many Arab-Israeli conflicts,  fuelled major migration flows of 
Palestinians, Yemenites, Egyptians and Lebanese towards the Gulf economies. 
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They were mostly unskilled workers that met the demand for growth of the oil 
sector and were accepted easily in the various destination countries because of their 
language, cultural and religious similarities that seemed capable of ensuring respect 
for individual national identities. These flows grew consistently throughout this 
period and peaked in period from 1970-1975 - which include the first oil shock - 
when about 1 million workers moved to this area. 
- The flows increased further in the second sub-period, ranging from the half of 
the 1970's to the end of the 1990's. In particular, over 4.5 million of foreign 
workers entered the Gulf countries in the 1975 - 1990 period in order to meet both 
the growing demand for manpower, due to the expansion and modernization of the 
oil sector and the requirements arising from the diversification of production 
processes that had started in the early 1980's. Indeed, major changes have started to 
surface in these years, increasing their importance in the 1990's as well as in the 
third sub-period. These changes have to do with the diversification of the 
employment sectors of the workforce, the increased demand for skilled workers 
and the origin of migration flows. 
The experience gathered in the 1970's and 1980's - when the major oil revenues 
piled up after the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks were depleted in a few years' time and 
the external surplus, along with the budget surplus, turned into a deficit - raised 
awareness of how transitional the positive effects produced by the increased oil 
revenues were and led the GCC countries to implement policies that were targeted 
at diversifying production activities so as to reduce the dependency of their 
economic growth on the ebb and flow of oil prices. These policies also ultimately 
resulted in fostering the creation and growth of the private sector, since they were 
supported by the introduction of privatization and liberalization processes. 
These developments fuelled the demand for manpower and can account not 
only for the major flows observed in this period, but also for the more diversified 
sector-related distribution of foreign labour along with the increased demand for 
skilled, highly-specialised workers (technicians, engineers, architects, medical 
doctors, managers, etc.). 
 However, the most striking changes have to do with the origin of migration 
flows. Indeed, the remarkable growth in the incidence of foreign workers of 
Arabian origin led to some concern both in political and in social and economic 
terms. As for the former, there were fears about  the possible spread of extremist 
and radical positions within the framework of a pan-Arabist ideology whereby the 
union of all Arab countries was to be regarded as the solution for the under-
development caused by colonialism. As for the latter, the concern was mostly 
focused on the expectations of Arab migrants to remain indefinitely in the Gulf 
countries, where they usually also took their families. Conversely, Asian workers 
proved less demanding: they accepted lower wages and temporary work; their 
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families stayed in their home countries; they were easier to employ and dismiss 
given the brokerage function discharged by Asian agencies in their recruitment.4 
The de-Arabization of labour was accelerated following the first Gulf War in 
1991. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq caused a major gap between Middle-Eastern 
pro-Iraq and pro-Kuwait countries, which was mirrored by migration flows once 
the war was over. About 2 million workers from countries that had supported Iraqi 
claims (Yemenites, Palestinians, Jordanians, Sudanese) were expelled from Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia and replaced by many Asian workers from India, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Overall, the incidence of the 
Arab component over the total migrants in the GCC region fell between 1975 and 
2004 from 72% to 32%, to the benefit of the Asian component (A.Kapiszweski, 
2006). 
- The third sub-period, which started with the new millennium, confirmed and 
emphasized the trends that had already begun during the second sub-period. The 
diversification of economic structures became the leading feature of this period 
along with the steady increase of oil prices that fuelled such diversification. Indeed, 
the oil price rise from 20 dollar/barrel in 2002 to over 140 dollar/barrel in 2008 
increased the flow of foreign exchange earnings from exports and allowed 
financing the investments and fiscal stimulus required by the process of growth in 
the non oil sector.  
However, the fast accumulation of foreign exchange reserves in small 
economies, where wealth is markedly concentrated and the public sector is under 
the control of a handful of powerful families, led entrepreneurs to invest mainly in 
areas where they could be executed more quickly and easily - which caused the 
unbridled growth of the real estate, building, and services sectors, i.e. of the so-
called FIRE (Financial, Insurance, Real Estate) economy. Due to the small 
domestic population, the feverish diversification process required additional 
inflows of foreign workers and led to new peak net migration flows - which were 
estimated to amount to about 2.5 million in the last decade (Fig. 3). 
Although it is impossible to gauge the real dimension of this phenomenon,5 over 
10 million of migrant workers are estimated to have entered the GCC region 
                                                 
4
 One of the reasons most frequently referred to in order to account for the fast-growing 
Asian immigration has to do exactly with the initiatives undertaken by the governments in 
the countries of origin, which have fostered migration in order to reduce unemployment 
within national borders. To that end, they have relied on specialised agencies that have 
channelled labour towards companies operating in the Gulf area by way of temporary, low-
wage contracts.  The number of such agencies has been rising quickly since the end 1970’s: 
they rose from 55 in 1977 to 300 in 1980 in Bangladesh; from 4 to 544 in Sri Lanka; from 
850 in 1980 to 1119 in 1985 in India; and from 650 to 964 in the Philippines during the 
same period (Kouaouci, 2006).  
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between 1950 and 2008 - whereby foreigners nowadays make up a considerable 
percentage of the total population and the foreign labour force outnumbers the 
domestic one in almost all the countries of this area.  
 
Figura 4 - Percentage Distribution of Population and Labour Force by 
Nationality1: 20082 
 
Sources: Labour Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA), Kingdom  of Bahrain, Bahrain 
Labour Market, 2009; Central Informatics Organization of Bahrain (CIO), Statistical 
Abstract, 2007; Institute of Banking Studies of Kuwait (Kibs), Economic and Financial 
Data base for 2009; Statistics Authority of Qatar, Labour Force Sample Survey, Results, 
December 2008; Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 45th Annual Report; UAE Ministry of 
Economy, UAE in Numbers 2007; UAE Ministry of Economy, Central Department of 
Statistics, Labour Force Survey, 2008. 
1Legend: BA (Bahrain); KU (Kuwait); OM (Oman); QA (Qatar); UAE (United Arab  Emirates); SA 
(Saudi Arabia).  2Data of Bahrain and Oman on population refer to 2007; those of UAE refer to 2005 
for population and to 2006 for labor force. 
 
As shown in Figure 4, the incidence of migrants on the total population ranges 
from 27% in Saudi Arabia to about 80% and 90% in the UAE and Qatar, 
respectively - while the foreign labour force rates are higher, being in excess of 
80% in Kuwait (84.4%), the UAE (92%) and Qatar  (94%). 
 
                                                                                                                            
5
 The difficulties here have to do with the poor quality of the statistics available from the 
countries in this area – which tend to downsize the numbers related to foreigners and 
emphasize those for domestic population – as well as with the impact produced by illegal 
migration. Although a work visa is necessary to enter these countries along with a permit to 
stay, many foreign workers enter the individual countries regularly, and then they become 
illegal migrants as they remain in GCC countries after expiry of the respective contracts – 
often with their employers’ full knowledge thereof. Other major illegal migration channels 
include ports, such as the one in Oman, as well as pilgrimages to Saudi Arabia: indeed, the 
latter allow being granted visas that often facilitate illegal migration (P. Cadène, 
B.Dumortier, 2008).  
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4. The Impact of Migration on the Labour Market 
 
It is understandable that the remarkable incidence of foreigners on the overall 
population and labour force has resulted in several problems for the Gulf 
economies - first and foremost the need to ensure citizens' rights by preserving 
their cultural identity. 
This requirement has led to the adoption of measures since the 1970's in order 
to ensure that foreigners could only stay on a temporary basis. To that end, they 
have been excluded from nationality rights, political and ownership rights, and 
welfare rights. Additionally, highly restrictive conditions have been imposed on 
family reunion; the duration of employment contracts has been rarely in excess of 
two years; and a recruitment mechanism has been introduced that relies on a 
sponsorship system (kafala), whereby any foreigner intending to work in a Gulf 
country should find a national of that country (kafil) who stands surety for him/her. 
In this way, the sponsorship system has increased the dependence of foreign 
workers on private nationals of the GCC countries, allowing the latter considerable 
influence on composition and amount of migration flows as well as allowing major 
flexibility in setting salaries and labour conditions - which often borders on 
exploitation and black market situations, as is the case with permits to stay. 
While several constraints limit foreigners' decision-making power, a number of 
benefits have been granted to nationals - including the right to study and receive 
medical care; free transportation systems; precedence in public employment and 
certain private sector activities; high wages and generous retirement benefits; and 
almost non-existent taxation. Thanks to the bountiful welfare system and the 
granting of specific rights, these States are enabling their nationals to benefit from 
oil export revenues. 
Thus, it can be argued that, on the whole, the high incidence of migrants on the 
overall population and labour force in the GCC countries has resulted in the 
unequal allocation of rights and duties, which has influenced the labour market and 
ultimately resulted in its segmentation. 
One major gap that has opened is the one separating the public from the private 
sector. The first is where most foreign labour can be found.  In all GCC countries 
the incidence of foreign labour on the total labour force is definitely higher than 
that of nationals, with rates in excess of 90% in Qatar (99.5%) and Kuwait (96.6%) 
(Fig.5). 
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Figura 5 - Distribution of Labor Force by Nationality in Private Sector and Public   
Sector  (%, 20081) 
 
Sources: Labour Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA), Bahrain Labour Market, 2009; 
Institute of Banking Studies of Kuwait (Kibs),  Economic and Financial Data base for 
2009; Statistics Authority of Qatar, Labour Force Sample Survey, Results, December 2008; 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 45th Annual Report; UAE,Ministry of Economy, UAE in 
Numbers 2007, UAE Ministry of Economy, Central Department of Statistics, Labour Force 
Survey, 2008. 
1Data  of  Oman refer to 2007. 
 
This can be accounted for by considerations relating both to the demand and to 
the offer of labour. On the demand side, entrepreneurs prefer foreigners because 
the recruitment mechanisms can ensure lower wages, longer work hours and higher 
possibilities for dismissal. On the offer side, the higher competition rate in the 
private sector makes the latter less appealing to nationals as it impacts on wage 
levels and labour conditions. Furthermore, the employment positions made 
available by the private sector are regarded as either excessively menial or 
inadequate to the formation that nationals have developed, which are essentially 
humanistic.  
The domestic workforce can be found mostly in the public sector, which it finds 
appealing because of the high wages, generous retirement benefits, favourable 
work conditions, and the social status that the public employment gives. In all GCC 
countries there is a high incidence of nationals in the public sector (Figure 5), the 
highest rates being those found in Saudi Arabia (92%), Oman (84.7%) and Bahrain 
(80.3%). 
Thus, migration flows have created two segments in the labour market that are 
totally different, not only due to the nationalities involved, but also in terms of their 
respective flexibility; indeed, the private sector is highly flexible6, while the public 
sector is completely non-flexible. 
                                                 
6
 The wage flexibility index as estimated by the World Economic Forum – ranging from 1 
to 7 – shows very high values ranging from 5.4% in Saudi Arabia to 6.2% in Qatar; 
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The rigidity of the public segment in the labour market can account, 
furthermore, for the paradox whereby high unemployment rates can be found 
among nationals of several countries in this area (Figure 6) in spite of the high 
demand for foreign labour. The rigidity in question actually hampers the migration 
of national and foreign workers between the public and the private sector and thus 
leads the former towards the public sector, which has by now reached saturation 
and can no longer absorb adequately the labour force. 
The cases of Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain are especially significant in this 
connection: the unemployment rate is close to 10%, 14%, and 18%, respectively, as 
regards nationals, while the rates concerning foreigners are very low (0.4%, 2.6%, 
2%, respectively) and foreign labour force makes up almost 80% of the total labour 
force in the private sector. The same applies to Oman, where unofficial sources 
estimate a total unemployment rate of about 15% (CIA, 2010). 
 
Figura 6 - Rate of Unemployment, 20081 
 
Sources: SAMA, 45th Annual Report; UAE Ministry of Economy, Central Department of 
Statistics, Labour Force Survey, 2008b; Qatar Statistics Authority, Labour Force Sample 
Results, 2008; Institute of Banking Studies of Kuwait, Economic and Financial Database 
for Bankers, 2009; Ministry of Labour and Bahrain Centre for Studies and Research, 
Labour Force Survey, November 2004. 
1
 Data of  Bahrain refer to 2004; data of  UAE refer to 2005.  
 
This problem is compounded if one considers the data relating to youth 
unemployment rate, which is on average in excess of 30% throughout the area. In 
fact, the occupational outlook of youths is a very serious issue for the GCC 
countries, given the high growth rate of national populations - estimated to be in 
excess of 2% in all countries. Among youths, those aged 0 to 24 years make up 
over 55% of the total in all countries, and their mainly humanities-oriented 
                                                                                                                            
conversely, the rigidity of employment index – ranging from 1 to 100 – shows very low 
values ranging from 27% in Saudi Arabia to 13% in Kuwait (World Economic Forum, 
2009).  
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curriculum in both high school and universities does not fit in with the 
occupational requirements arising from the needs of economic growth.  
Faced with the urgent need to cope with this issue, national policies have 
followed a three-fold approach: a) on the one hand, the production structure has 
been diversified further to stimulate demand for labour in a way that can meet the 
requirements of a young, rapidly growing population, which the oil sector is unable 
to ensure on its own given its capital intensive nature; b) on the other hand, 
educational and training policies have been implemented to promote skills 
appropriate to the needs of the labor market; c) thirdly, the nationalization of the 
labour force has been fostered (Saudization, Omanization, Kuwaitization, etc.). 
As for the latter, governments in the GCC countries have tried to increase the 
incidence of nationals on the workforce by way of various measures, including the 
ban on recruiting foreigners or the obligation to reserve labour quotas for nationals 
regarding certain activities; the granting of facilitations to businesses if they 
employ nationals, coupled with the imposition of taxes in case they recruit 
foreigners; the extension of the benefits featuring in the public sector to some 
private sector occupations so as to make them more appealing to nationals. 
However, nationalization policies only have proved successful in the public 
sector. In the private sector market logic has continued to predominate. Indeed, the 
higher competitiveness of foreign labour in terms of wages, productivity, and work 
conditions have led companies to ignore the prohibition on recruitment and 
disregard the facilitations envisaged for the employment of nationals. On  the other 
hand, the fast pace of growth of these economies and their high population growth 
rates have determined new needs and demands that the national component of the 
population is unable to meet because it lack the required skills and/or is not 
interested there in. Additionally, given the marked segmentation of the labour 
market, nationalization policies actually have increased social segmentation as 
well. 
 
 
5. Social Segmentation 
 
In the presence of a social system featuring the high incidence of foreigners on 
both the overall population and the labour force, nationalization policies have 
increased the unequal allocation of rights and duties and fuelled mutual tensions 
and grievances between nationals and foreigners. The former blame the latter for 
their unfair competition in the private sector, which makes difficult for them to get 
access to private employment and worsens the overall work conditions; the latter 
blame the former for the privileges they enjoy, which are regarded as completely 
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inadequate in the light of their contribution to the fast growth experienced by the 
Gulf economies. 
However, segmentation has affected not only foreigners vs. nationals, but it 
could also be found among the former - where different segments can be defined 
depending on nationality, work executed, education levels and skills, and the 
underlying cultural models. This has translated into a sort of social scale, ranging 
from Westerners to non-Gulf Arabians up to Asians, as well as in major differences 
in terms of wage levels and living conditions. In short, a major gap has arisen 
between Western workers, mainly Europeans and North Americans, and the Asian 
labour force. 
The former are a small minority of the foreign population, practising highly-
skilled professions and usually covering high-level positions in the GCC societies. 
The main reason why they are welcome to Gulf nationals consists in their having 
chosen to work in their countries on a purely voluntary basis, on account of the 
high living standards they can afford in those countries. Additionally, their choice 
is usually a temporary one, given that they ultimately expect to get back to the 
highly-developed countries they come from.  Conversely, for all the other workers, 
and in particular for Asian workers, the decision to migrate is mostly mandated by 
the difficult living conditions existing in their countries, which often makes it 
impossible for them to get back home and obliges them to accept more burdensome 
and vexatious conditions. It is no mere chance that contract labourers are mostly to 
be found among Asian workers. Those labourers are usually recruited by brokerage 
agencies in the respective countries of origin. They are unskilled, illiterate workers 
and usually live in labour camps from which they are taken daily to the places they 
have to work - mostly construction sites and farms. Given their humble conditions 
and the recruitment mechanisms, they are especially prone to the risk of 
exploitation and abuse - including lower wages, forfeiture of their passports, 
deduction of visa-related costs from their wages, black market trafficking in visas, 
extended working hours, delayed payment of their wages, dangerous working 
conditions, and segregation in labour camps as they are prohibited from living in 
urban areas and/or going to urban areas at night. 
Accordingly, the unequal distribution of wealth, rights and duties in a society 
featuring a large number of foreigners fuels a climate of conflict, not only among 
nationals, but also among expatriates.  Thus, non-Gulf Arab workers believe they 
are discriminated against compared to Asian workers as regards recruitment, in 
spite of their language and cultural similarities with the nationals; Asian workers 
claim they get lower wages and are exposed to unhealthy living conditions; 
nationals in turn see the massive numbers of foreign workers as a threat for the 
social and political stability of their countries in terms of loss of cultural identity 
and captive foreign policy decisions. Against this backdrop, the greatest fears felt 
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by GCC nationals over the past few years have resulted from the fast growth rate of 
Asians - in particular Indians and Bengalis, who make up the majority of foreigners 
as well as including most contract labourers (Fig. 7). 
 
Figura 7 - Main Expatriate Communities in GCC Countries (values in thousands)1 
 
Source: A. Kapiszewski, Arab versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries, 
UN/POP/EGM/2006/02, 22 May 2006.  
1Estimates for various years: Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, 2004; Kuwait, 2003; Qatar, UAE, 2002. 
 
In a context of a highly unequal, segmented, increasingly conflictual society, 
the effects of the global economic imbalance were produced. Those effects were 
increased by the characteristics of the exchange rate regime of the Gulf countries. 
 
 
6. Exchange Rate Regimes in the GCC Countries 
 
For over thirty years the GCC countries have been formally or informally 
pegging their currencies to the dollar7. However, since 1 January 2003 the Gulf 
economies have officially adopted a dollar peg regime as a first step towards their 
full monetary integration.8   
The reasons which led the GCC members to link their currencies to the dollar 
are basically two-fold: 
1. firstly, one should consider the marked incidence of oil revenues on total 
exports and public revenues. Since international oil prices are in dollars, pegging 
                                                 
7
 Oman has officially pegged the riyal to the US currency since 1973; while Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE, despite having de jure tied their currencies to the SDR until 
2001, de facto have pegged the dollar at a fixed rate since the eighties. Even the Kuwaiti 
dinar, which was formally tied to a basket peg until 2002, has always shown a pronounced 
stability against the dollar. 
8
 However, Kuwait withdrew from the agreement in may 2007 and re-instated the previous 
basket peg regime.  
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national currencies to the US currency can ensure the stability of export earnings 
and government revenues, reducing foreign exchange risk. 
2. secondly, one should consider the delays that still characterize the financial, 
economic and institutional structures of the GCC countries.  These suggest 
anchoring their currencies to that of a country with strong institutions and traditions 
of stability in order to import that stability along with the credibility and 
confidence in their respective economies. 
Indeed, the dollar peg allowed the GCC members to keep price dynamics 
basically stable for over twenty years. Still, the worsening of the global economic 
imbalance that started in 2002, along with the widening of the gap between the 
growing deficit of the US balance of payments  and the balance surplus of the Gulf 
countries, ultimately resulted in turning the dollar peg into a vehicle of instability 
from the anchor country to the GCC economies - via both a liquidity effect and a 
cost effect. 
 
 
6.1. Inflationary Effects Produced by the Dollar Peg: the Liquidity Effect. 
 
The dollar peg translated the standing surpluses of the balances of payments in 
the GCC countries - resulting from the increase in the world oil demand as well as 
in oil prices - into monetary base increases (Fig.8).  
 
Figura 8 – Monetary Base (values in national currencies) 
             
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 2009b 
 
This led to the well-known dilemma of the so-called impossible trinity - i.e. the 
impossibility to simultaneously pursue the three objectives consisting of internal 
balance, external balance, and exchange stability in the presence of fixed exchange 
rates. 
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In the experience of the GCC countries, the objective renounced was the 
achievement of internal balance.  Indeed, the need to defend the exchange rate and 
prevent capital inflows made it difficult to keep monetary circulation under control. 
This led to the alignment of the GCC member interest rates to the lower US rates, 
at a time when the rapidly growing economies of the area would have required 
more stringent monetary policies. This can be seen quite clearly from 2007 
onwards, when the short-term interest rates of Gulf countries fell in parallel with 
those of the US, despite the pressure of inflation existing in their economies. The 
consequences were negative real interest rates, which encouraged borrowing and 
the expansion of monetary offer in its broadest sense (Figure 9). This fuelled 
inflation and gave rise to speculative bubbles in those areas where bottlenecks were 
especially rife - e.g. the real estate sector.  
 
Figura 9 – Interest Rate and Inflation Rate 
 
Sources: Qatar Central Bank; Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency; Kuwait Central Bank; 
UAE Central Bank; www.global-rates.com;  IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle 
East and Central Asia. 
1
 UAE data refer to the central bank overnight interest rate. 
 
The mean inflation rate as measured from the consumer price index rose in the 
GCC countries as a whole from 0.2% in 1998-2002 to 10.2% in 2008 - the peak 
values being recorded in Qatar (15%), Oman (12.6%), and UAE (11.5%). In Saudi 
Arabia, where inflation was always lower than 1%, consumer prices rose starting 
from 2006 so that the 2008 inflation rate was as high as 10% (Figure 9). 
The peak increase concerned food and housing prices, which impact to a greater 
extent on the living standards of the poorest part of the population. More 
specifically, in the 2004 - 2008 period food prices rose by between 24% - 30% in 
the Gulf countries with peak increases of 29.7% and 30.1% in Qatar and the UAE, 
respectively.  As to the latter, the increase was in excess of 46% in the Emirates 
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(UAE Ministry of Economy, 2008a) and peaked at 60% in Qatar (Qatar Central 
Bank, 2008). 
Thus, it can be argued that - in the presence of diverging economic cycles in the 
GCC countries as opposed to the US - the dollar peg translated an inflation process 
initiated by the increase in the international oil demand as well as in oil prices into 
the expansion of the monetary base, which ultimately fuelled inflation.9 
The inflationary effect was actually also due to a cost effect that was fostered by 
the dollar peg and amplified by the features of the local labour market. 
 
 
6.2. Inflationary Effects Produced by the Dollar Peg: the Pass-Through Effect 
 
The dollar peg converted the depreciation of the US currency, which featured in 
the 2002 - 2008 period, compared to the currencies of the main GCC countries' 
trade partners in increased costs, due to the pass-through mechanism. Indeed, it 
also entailed the depreciation of the GCC currencies compared to the euro, yen, 
and the UK pound, raising the prices in national currency for imported goods. In 
this connection, special importance should be attached to the depreciation of the 
US dollar compared to the euro, since Europe is the main import area for the GCC 
members.10 
This effect plays a major role in the Gulf countries, as their economies are: 
small-sized; open to international trade; highly focused on oil production; with a 
segmented labour market and a considerable incidence of foreign workers; with 
limited agricultural production and manufacturing, for which they have to turn 
abroad to import a large share of their consumer goods, raw materials, intermediate 
inputs and capital goods. 
Special importance should be attached in this context to the fact that these 
countries are highly dependent on imports of farming produce and food. The latter 
are a significant portion of their total imports - with peak values recorded in 2008 
in Kuwait (16%), Saudi Arabia (13.2%), Oman (10.9%) and Emirates (9.2%) 
(WTO, 2009b). Indeed, the dry climate, the scarcity of arable land, and the high 
                                                 
9
 From an econometric standpoint, this conclusion is supported by a study performed by 
Saidi, Scacciavillani, Prasad and Ali to identify the factors that influence inflation pressure 
in GCC countries (2009). Based on VAR models of different complexity, they showed that 
the monetary base changes were the key determinants of the inflationary spiral.  
10
 The pass-through effect was recently estimated to range between 25% and 35% (Al-
Qudsi, Kaloti, Numan, Obeid, Marar, 2008). Accordingly, if a 10% depreciation rate of the 
US dollar translates into a 3% increase of the inflation rate, the depreciation cumulated by 
the US dollar vis-à-vis the Euro in the 2002 to 2008 period – amounting approximately to 
30% - may have resulted into increasing the inflationary pressure by about 15%.  
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population growth rates make the internal supply insufficient to meet domestic 
needs and require these countries to import considerable amounts of food - whose 
prices markedly impact on the living conditions of working classes and, above all, 
migrant workers. Against this backdrop, it can be easily understood that - given the 
dollar peg - any increase in import prices resulting from the depreciation of the  
dollar can jeopardize the working classes' living standards and fuel demands for 
wage rises along with social tensions. 
In fact, the particular structure of the labour market interacted with the specific 
features of the exchange rate regime giving rise to a mixed inflationary spiral, in 
which the pressures on the cost side overlapped with the tensions on the demand 
side. 
 
 
7. The Influence of Labour Market Features on Inflationary Dynamics 
 
In the context of a highly segmented and conflictual labour market, where 
migrants predominate and the allocation of rights and duties is imbalanced, the 
effects of inflation, initiated by the oil price increase and amplified by the dollar 
peg in the presence of the global economic imbalance, should be assessed.  
The price increases, especially those of food and housing, translated into a 
reduction of real income for a large section of the population - with particular 
regard to the poorer migrants - and resulted in wage increase claims among 
growing tensions. 
The highest wage increases were granted in the public sector. From 2005 to 
2007, public salaries were repeatedly increased in all GCC members - the peak 
growth  being the one found in the Emirates (125%) (Gulf Talent, 2008). This 
contributed to enlarging the inequalities existing in a labour market which was 
already markedly segmented, as it made the public sector employment more 
appealing and more difficult for the private sector to employ national workers. 
Accordingly, the private sector's dependency upon foreign manpower increased 
further at a time of strong wage demands, due to the need to defend the purchasing 
power of wages. This resulted ultimately in a steady increase in basic salaries: the 
highest increases were granted by the construction and banking sectors. More 
specifically, in the 2005 - 2009 period wages rose in the GCC countries as a whole 
by about 41% - the peak values being recorded in UAE (46.6%) (Gulf Talent, 
2009b). 
     Wage increases were also favored by the effects produced by the dollar peg on 
the value of migrants' remittances. The dollar depreciation throughout the 2002 to 
2008 period could be observed not only with regard to the main currencies, but also 
in respect of some of the countries from which the main migration flows originate. 
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In particular, from December 2003 to December 2007 the dollar depreciated by 
17% and 33.5% compared to Indian rupee and the Filipino pesos, respectively.  
Due to the dollar peg, the Gulf currencies also showed the same level of 
depreciation, which resulted in reducing the value of remittances as calculated in 
the currencies of the countries of origin of migrants.  
This data should not be overlooked, considering the high incidence of migrants 
on the total population and labour force in the GCC countries. The temporary work 
contracts and the many obstacles hampering family reunions are leading migrants 
to send a considerable part of their wages back home11 and assess their savings in 
the currencies of their countries (Razgallah, 2007; Nauful, Termos, 2009).  In this 
context, the dollar depreciation contributed to fuelling the claims for wage 
increases. 
The greatest claims came from Indian workers, who are the majority of foreign 
workers and,  in particular,  of contract workers. Being increasingly aware of their 
numbers as well as of the changed conditions in the labour market of their home 
country - where growth was accompanied by major wage increases - and faced 
with the exploitation and vexatious recruitment mechanisms they are subjected to, 
they have staged major strikes and demonstrations that have led their wages to 
increase in recent years at a faster pace than those of workers from other countries 
(Gulf Talent, 2008).  
In conclusion, the peculiar structure of the labour market in the GCC countries 
interacted with the exchange rate regime, giving rise to a mixed inflation in which 
the pressure on the cost side overlapped with those on the demand side.  
 
 
8. Conclusions: the Need for the GCC Countries to Amend their Exchange  
    Rate Regimes 
 
The GCC countries are characterized by a small indigenous population; the 
need to import labor from abroad to meet the demand coming from the oil sector 
and the diversification processes of the production structure; a high proportion of 
immigrants in the population and in the labor force; a wide-ranging inequalities in 
social and economic terms. Given these features, it is fundamental for them to 
reconcile growth with social stability. The latter requires a more equitable 
allocation of rights and duties along with not only more effective actions in terms 
                                                 
11
 Saudi Arabia’s ranks second worldwide in terms of remittances sent abroad, while the 
remaining countries of the GCC are among the first thirty ones on this list. Still, in terms of 
percent incidence of remittances on the GDP, these countries rank much higher on the list – 
Bahrain ranks fourth  and  Kuwait is the twelfth (World Bank, 2008). 
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of human rights, but also more stable economic dynamics such as preventing the 
redistribution effects of inflation from increasing inequalities in income allocation. 
The anti-inflationary objective is a priority for the Gulf countries, which entails 
not only countering the effects, but also removing the causes of inflation. 
The experience of the new millennium has shown that the dollar peg was a 
major vehicle of inflation for the GCC members and suggests that it should be 
amended. An alternative might consist of a basket peg system, whereby national 
currencies could be anchored to a basket of strong currencies that mirror direction 
and intensity of commercial and financial flows on the international market.12 
Given this context, it would be appropriate to include the euro in the said 
basket. Indeed, including the euro can reduce the risks related to possible exchange 
losses, pass-through effect and unwanted liquidity changes due to the exclusive 
anchorage to the US dollar. 
(Exchange Risks) - In small economies such as those of the Gulf countries, 
which are open to international exchanges, trade relations play a key role and make 
it especially advisable to rely on an exchange rate regime that can reduce 
transactional costs as related to currency conversion and the exchange risk. This 
requires considering direction and composition of trade flows. 
As for the GCC countries,  oil exports is the main item of their sales abroad, 
with an incidence over total sales ranging from about 40% in the Arab Emirates to 
over 83% in Kuwait. Such sales are targeted mainly at Asian countries; conversely, 
Europe is the main partner of the Gulf countries in terms of their imports, which 
consist basically in food and manufactured products. 
Taking account of this framework, special importance should be attached to the 
features of the exchange rate regime. The currency revenues related to exports are 
essentially in dollars, both because oil is quoted in US dollars and because the 
latter are widely used as transaction currency in Asian countries. Conversely, their 
imports are paid mostly in euro, given the current practices whereby European 
countries quote their exports in the respective national currencies. Accordingly, the 
euro/dollar exchange rate plays a key role in the GCC region and in the past decade 
it has caused significant currency losses because of the trend towards depreciation 
of the US currency compared to the euro. This would appear to suggest that greater 
consideration should be given to the euro in the GCC countries' exchange rate 
system.  
                                                 
12
 A more in-depth overview of the benefits resulting from a basket peg to the GCC 
countries can  be found in the following: Nuri Erbas, Guerami (2003); Aleisa, Hammoudeh, 
Yuan (2008); Habib, Stràsky (2008); Khan (2008); O. Marzovilla (2010); O. Marzovilla, 
M. Mele (2010). Some studies attempted to determine the appropriate composition of this 
basket: see Aleisa, Hammoudeh, Yuan (2008); Jen and Bindelli (2008); Saidi, 
Scacciavillani, Prasad, and Ali (2008).  
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 (The Pass-through Effect) - The importance of imports to the Gulf area from 
Europe increases the risks related to the pass-through effect. Europe is actually the 
source of 33.4% of the imports for Qatar; 31.9% of the imports for Saudi Arabia; 
28.5% for Kuwait; 22% for the Arab Emirates; and 17.1% for Oman (WTO, 
2009b)13. Given this framework, the dollar depreciation compared to the euro - as 
was the case in the 2002-2008 period - entails the depreciation of the Gulf 
currencies as well and might translate into a major increase in the price of the 
goods imported from the EU as calculated in national currencies, such as resulting 
in significant inflationary pressure on the costs side. The latter pressure might be 
reduced by introducing a basket peg, in which the weight allocated to the euro 
should mirror its use in trade transactions of the GCC members. 
(The Liquidity Effect) - Including the euro in the basket might also reduce the 
unwanted liquidity changes due to the dollar peg. 
The unquestionable predominance of import flows of the Gulf countries from 
the EU compared to export flows can account for the trade surplus that the 
European area taken as a whole generally shows respect to the GCC region - unlike 
the deficits shown by the other major trade partners of the Middle Eastern countries 
(WTO, 2009a). 
This is an important item in order to devise an exchange rate system that can 
appropriately meet the requirements coming from the GCC members. Indeed, 
creating links to the currency of an area that - given the structure of its trade 
relations with the Gulf countries - mostly shows trade surpluses can allow such 
countries to partly recover their monetary sovereignty by limiting the expansion 
effects on the monetary base that result from their being anchored to the currency 
of a country that shows systematic trade deficits respect to them. 
(Stabilization of Remittances) - The dollar depreciation that has featured 
throughout the last decade along with the oscillations observed in the latest part of 
the decade - including revaluation in 2008, depreciation in early 2009, revaluation 
in April-May 2010 - has produced destabilizing effects on the value of the 
remittances from foreign workers, which are the majority of the overall labour 
force. These continuous oscillations have given rise to uncertainty among 
expatriates, influencing their families' living conditions and fuelling tensions in the 
labour market. The basket peg may reduce those uncertainties by enabling greater 
stability of nominal effective exchange rates. 
One may therefore conclude that the advantage of a basket peg including the 
euro would consist of preserving the benefits in terms of credibility and stability of 
                                                 
13
 The percent rates related to the US are rather smaller: 13% SA, 11.3% KU, 9% QA, 7% 
UAE, 5.7% OM. 
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expectations that arise from the anchorage to currencies with a strong and 
established reputation. At the same time, it would contribute to stabilizing nominal 
effective exchange rates along with the value of remittances in the currencies of the 
migrants' countries, while reducing the risks due to the pass-through effect and 
restoring some measure of flexibility in monetary policies - which would partly 
reduce the constraints imposed by their dependency on the US monetary policy. 
Although the dollar has appreciated in recent times and uncertainties have 
focused on the euro, the experience of the past decade shows that the weakness of 
the US currency - which has prevailed over most of the past decade - may no 
longer be construed as an episodic event. In fact, it mirrors a world that is no longer 
as asymmetrical as the one that emerged from World War II. Indeed, the USA are 
still the world's most powerful economy; however, their leadership is no longer 
absolute and unquestioned, as it has to come to terms with a new reality that has 
been developing during this new millennium. It is a reality where globalization is 
advancing and speculation is on the rise, while the global economic imbalance is 
worsening and new major players are emerging on the international scene, 
including several developing countries and a large unified monetary and economic 
area, i.e. the European Monetary Union. 
Given this context, one may not rule out a new trend of depreciation of the 
dollar in the coming years and, in presence of dollar peg, a new inflationary spiral 
in the economies of the GCC. The major costs due to inflation in the Gulf countries 
- given their economic, demographic, and social structures - would point to the 
advisability of amending their exchange rate regimes by relying on a basket peg. 
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